I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional digital signature schemes, certificates that are signed by a trusted third party are used to 'bind' the user's identity and his public key. In [1] , Shamir introduced a new notion called identity-based cryptography where the user's public key is indeed his identity (such as an email address, an IP address, etc.). This way, the need of certification can be avoided. In identity-based cryptography, the user's secret key is generated by Key Generation Center (KGC). Therefore, there is an inherent key escrow problem in such a cryptosystem.
To fill the gap between traditional cryptography and identitybased cryptography, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a new paradigm called certificateless cryptography in [2] . In a certificateless cryptosystem, KGC is involved to issue a partial key for user. The user also independently generates an additional public/secret key pair and performs some cryptographic operations in such a way that they can only be carried out when both the user's partial key and the user's secret key are known. Knowing one of them should not be able to impersonate the user and carry out any of the cryptographic operations as the user. Therefore, certificateless cryptography not only solves the key escrow problem that is inherent in identity-based cryptography, but also eliminates the use of certificates as in traditional digital signature schemes, which are generally considered to be costly to use and manage.
Due to the lack of public key authentication, it is important to assume that an adversary can replace the user's public key by a false key of its choice [2] . In order to provide a secure certificateless signature scheme, this type of attacks must not be able to produce signatures that pass verification with the replaced public key [2] . An assumption that must be made is that the KGC does not mount a public key replacement attack since he possesses the master-key and can generate all user's partial private keys. It is reasonable that we suppose KGC is trusted not to replace public keys. This way, the level of trust is similar to the trust in a CA in a traditional PKI. We will review the adversarial model defined in [2] , [3] in the next section.
Many certificateless public key encryption schemes [2] , [4] - [7] and certificateless signature schemes (CLS) [2] , [3] , [8] - [11] have been proposed since certificateless public key cryptography was introduced. The first CLS scheme was proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson in [2] but there is no security proof provided. Besides, their CLS scheme has been proven insecure in their defined model by Huang et al. [11] . They showed that an adversary can successfully forge a certificateless signature by replacing the public key of the signer and proposed a new scheme, which resists against the above attack. Recently, Huang et al. [17] revisited the security models of certificateless signatures and proposed two new constructions which are provably secure in the random oracle model. Yum and Lee [8] proposed a generic construction of CLS based on an identitybased signature scheme and a traditional public key signature scheme, which is a different approach in constructing CLS. The merit of the above approach is that the resulting CLS scheme can achieve the same trust level as that of a traditional signature scheme. Hu et al. [12] showed that their generic construction was insecure against public key replacement attack. In particular, they showed that the security requirements of their generic building blocks are insufficient to support some security claims stated in [8] . Hu et al. also proposed a modification of their scheme and showed its security in a new and simplified security model. Wang et al. proposed a certificateless threshold signature scheme [10] based on bilinear pairings. Their scheme is robust and existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks under computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Zhang et al. [3] presented a security model for certificateless public-key signature schemes, and proposed an efficient construction based on bilinear pairings. Recently, Yap et al. proposed an efficient certificateless signature scheme [9] . In Yap's scheme, by using a shorter public key, there are only two pairing computations in the verification algorithm. Besides, no pairing computation is needed in the signing algorithm. Hence, their scheme is more efficient than the existing certificateless signature scheme. However, as we will show in this paper, the certificateless signature scheme proposed by Yap et al. is insecure against public key replacement attack.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we show that the scheme proposed by Yap et al. does not resist against public key replacement attacks, and gives the main cause suffered from attack. More precisely, we show that an attacker who does not possess the master-key but can only do a public key replacement attack, can always successfully forge a signature. In addition, the message of the forgery can be chosen arbitrarily by the adversary. The main difference compared with a common public key replacement attack used in the other certificateless signature scheme [11] , [12] is that the adversary can obtain the user's full private key defined in their scheme [9] when he/she replaces the public key of this user. Furthermore, we propose a provably secure efficient certificateless signature scheme, which is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model under adaptive chosen message attacks and proves the security of the proposed scheme in Zhang's security model [3] . Compared with Yap's security proof, our proof can be obtained without the requirement that A I should have submitted the secret information s ID corresponding to the replaced public-key P K ID when querying the signing oracle and making forgery.
Organization of the Paper
In the next section, we will review some preliminaries required throughout the paper. We review an efficient certificateless signature scheme [9] in Section III. In Section IV, we will show the above scheme fails to resist against the public key replacement attack. We propose an efficient certificateless signature scheme in Section V. In Section VI, we prove the security of the proposed scheme in Zhang's security model [3] . Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will review some fundamental backgrounds required in this paper, namely bilinear pairing, the definition and security model of the certificateless signature scheme.
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let G 1 denote an additive group of prime order q and G 2 be a multiplicative group of the same order. Let P denote a generator in G 1 . Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
• The map e is bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab for all
• The map e is non-degenerate: e(P, P ) = 1 G2 .
• The map e is efficiently computable.
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A in solving CDH problem in G 1 is defined to be
The CDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, Succ CDH A,G1 is negligible.
B. Certificateless Signature Schemes
A certificateless signature scheme is defined by seven algorithms (see literature [2] ): Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, CLSign, and CL-Verify. The description of each algorithm is as follows.
• Setup: The master key and parameter generation algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that accepts as input a security parameter 1 k and returns a master-key and a parameter list params.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: The partial private key issuance algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that accepts as input a user identity ID, a parameter list param and a master-key to produce the user's partial private key D ID .
• Set-Secret-Value: The set secret value setup algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that accepts as input a parameter list param and a user identity ID to produce the user's secret value s ID .
• Set-Private-Key: The set private key setup algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that accepts as input a parameter list param, the user's partial private key D ID and the user's secret value s ID to produce a private signing key SK ID .
• Set-Public-Key: The public key generation algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a parameter list param, a user identity ID and the user's secret value s ID to produce a public key P K ID .
• CL-Sign: The signing algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that accepts a message M ∈ M, M is the message space, a user's identity ID, a parameter list param and the user's signing key SK ID to produce a signature σ.
• CL-Verify: The verification algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that accepts a message M , a signature σ, a parameter list param, the public key P K ID and the user's identity ID to output true if the signature is correct, otherwise outputs ⊥.
C. Adversarial Model of Certificateless Signature Schemes
As defined in [2] , there are two types of adversary with different capabilities: Type I Adversary: This type of adversary A I does not have access to the master-key, but A I has the ability to replace the public key of any entity with a value of his choice, because there is no certificate involved in certificateless signature schemes. Type II Adversary: This type of adversary A II has access to the master-key but cannot perform public keys replacement.
Nevertheless, no formal security model was presented in [2] . Huang et al. [11] and Zhang et al. [3] provided a formal definition of existential unforgeability of a certificateless signature scheme under both two types of chosen message attack, respectively. In this section, we review the security model proposed by Zhang et al. [3] , which are defined using the following two games between an adversary A ∈ {A I , A II } and a challenger. Game-I: This is the game in which A I interacts with the challenger:
• Phase I-1: The challenger runs Setup(1 k ) for generating master-key and params. The challenger then gives params to A I while keeping master-key secret.
• Phase I-2: A I performs the following oracle-query operations: -Extract Partial Private Key: Each of which is denoted by (ID, "partial key extract" * cannot be an identity for which the private key has been extracted. Also, ID * cannot be an identity for which both the public key has been replaced and the partial private key has been extracted. Moreover, M * should not be queried to the signing oracle with respect to ID * and P K ID * . However, in case the P K ID * is different from the original public key of the entity with identity ID * , A I does not need to provide the corresponding secret value to the challenger if it has not made signing queries for the identity ID * and public key P K ID * .
Game II: This is a game in which A II interacts with the challenger.
• Phase II-1: The challenger runs Setup(·) to generate master-key and params. 
where k is the system's security parameter.
III. REVIEW OF AN EFFICIENT CERTIFICATELESS SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this secion, we review an efficient certificateless signature Scheme [9] proposed by Yap et al. The scheme is as follows: 1. Setup: Given a security parameter k, the algorithm works as follows: (a) Let (G 1 , G 2 ) be groups with prime order q. e denotes the bilinear pairing
The system parameters are params =< G 1 , G 2 , e, q, P, P 0 , H 1 , H 2 >. The message space and master-key are M = {0, 1} * and s ∈ Z Z * q , respectively. 2. Set-Partial-Private-Key: Given params and master-key, this algorithm works as follows:
3. Set-Secret-Key: Given params, select a random value x A ∈ Z Z * q , where x A is the secret value. 4. Set-Private-Key: Set private key S A = (x A Q A + D A ). 5. Set-Public-Key: Given params and the secret value x A , this algorithm computes P A = x A P ∈ G 1 . 6. Sign: Given params, ID A , message m and private key S A , the algorithm works as follows:
(e) Set σ = (U, V ) as the signature of m. 7. Verify: Given signature σ, ID A , m, P A , this algorithm works as follows:
valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, i.e., by verifying whether e(P, V ) = e(P 0 + P A , U + hQ A ). If not, then reject the signature else accept it. In a CLS, Setup and Setup-Partial-Private-Key are performed by a KGC. A partial private key D A is given to a user A by the KGC through a secure channel.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF YAP ET AL.'S CERTIFICATELESS SIGNATURE SCHEME
Yap et al. claimed that their scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model [13] under the CDH assumption. Parallelled with the work of [18] , as we will show in this section, their certificateless signature scheme does not resist against type I adversary as defined in [2] . By replacing the public key P A of the user A, a type I adversary A I can corrupt this user's private key S A , and therefore, can output a forged signature on any message. The attack method is as follows: 1. Public-Key-Replacement: Firstly, A I chooses a random r ∈ Z Z * q , then he/she replaces the target user's public key as P A = rP − P 0 . 2. Private-Key-Corruption: Secondly, A I computes the target user's private key S A = rQ A . S A is the valid private key since
3. Signature-Forgery: Finally, for a message m, A I uses S A to compute signature (U, V ) by the same way as the Sign algorithm defined in Section III. Evidently (U, V ) is a valid signature. Remarks: In the common public key replacement attack, the adversary only replaces target user's public key and doesn't get corresponding private key. Our attack method can not only replace target user's public key but also obtain the full private key corresponding to modified public key of the user. Hence, anyone can forge a valid certificateless signature. The main cause that Yap et al.'s scheme does not resist against public key replacement attack if their key generation is not proper. In Yap et al.'s scheme [9] , Adversary chooses a random r ∈ Z Z * q and replaces public key as P A = r P − P 0 , which means corresponding secret key is x A = r −s. Though the adversary does not know the master-key of the KGC, he/she can eliminate the master-key of the KGC and compute the full private key of the target user by the equation
Therefore, the adversary with private key S A is easy to forge a valid certificateless signature according to signature step of the original scheme.
We also show Yap et al.'s scheme is insecure by the usual public key replacement attack. Our attack method is as follows: The adversary firstly chooses a random r ∈ Z Z * q , then he/she replaces target user's public key as P A = rP − P 0 . Secondly, he/she randomly selects U ∈ G 1 , computes Q A = H 1 (ID A ) ∈ G 1 and h = H 2 (m||U ) ∈ Z Z * q . Finally, he/she computes V = r(U + hQ A ). Then the tuple (U, V ) is a valid certificateless signature scheme. We can see that verification will pass because the following verification equation holds
= e(P, r(U + hQ A )) = e(P, V ).
V. A NEW AND EFFICIENT CERTIFICATELESS SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this secion, we present an efficient certificateless signature scheme. The scheme is as follows: 1. Setup: Given a security parameter k, the algorithm works as follows: (a) Let (G 1 , G 2 ) be groups with prime order q. e denotes the bilinear pairing
The system parameters are params =< G 1 , G 2 , e, q, P, P pub , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 >. The message space is M = {0, 1}
* . The master-key is s ∈ Z Z * q . 2. Set-Partial-Private-Key : Given params and masterkey, this algorithm works as follows:
, where x A is the secret value. 4. Set-Private-Key: Given params, the partial private key D A , the secret value x A and outputs full private key S A = (D A , x A ). 5. Set-Public-Key: Given params and the secret value x A , this algorithm computes P A = x A P ∈ G 1 . 6. Sign: Given params, ID A , message m and private key S A , the algorithm works as follows:
(c) Check whether the following verification equation e(P, V ) = e(P A , W ) e(P pub , U + hQ A ) holds. If not, then reject the signature else accept it. The correctness of our scheme follows from the fact that
In a CLS, Setup and Set-Partial-Private-Key are performed by a KGC. A partial private key D A is given to a user A by the KGC through a secure channel.
VI. SECURITY PROOF Theorem 1:
For the A I adversary, the proposed certificateless signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under the assumption that the CDH problem in G 1 is intractable.
Proof: Let A I be a Type I adversary who can break the proposed scheme under adaptive chosen-message attacks. We show how A I can be used by a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm B to solve the CDH problem in G 1 . It is interesting to note that the reductionist proof can be obtained without the requirement that A I should have submitted the secret information s ID corresponding to the replaced public-key P K ID when querying the signing oracle. Let (X = aP, Y = bP ) ∈ G 1 × G 1 be a random instance of the CDH problem taken as input by B. The algorithm B initializes A I with P pub = X, and then starts performing oracle simulation. Without loss of generality, we assume that, for any key extraction query or signature query involving an identity, an H 1 (·) oracle query has previously been made on that identity. And B maintains a list L = (ID, D ID , P K ID , s ID ) while A I is making queries throughout the game. B responds to A I 's oracle queries as follows.
Queries on Oracle H
where T ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q H1 }, q H1 is the most times for H 1 query.
• If an identity ID has appeared on list L 1 = (ID, t 1 , T ), then B responds with H 1 (ID) according to T value.
• If an identity ID has not appeared on the list and ID is the I th distinct H 1 query made by A I , then B picks t 1 ∈ Z Z * q at random and returns H 1 (ID) = t 1 Y ∈ G 1 . Otherwise the hash value H 1 (ID) is defined as t 1 P ∈ G 1 . In both cases, B inserts a tuple (ID, t 1 , T ) in a list L 1 = (ID, t 1 , T ) to keep track the way it answered the queries. Partial Private Key Queries: Suppose the request is on an identity ID. B recovers the corresponding (ID, t 1 , T ) from the list L 1 (recall that such a tuple must exist because of the aforementioned assumption). If T = I, then B outputs "failure" and halts because it is unable to coherently answer the query. Otherwise, B looks up the list L and performs as follows.
• •
Otherwise, B randomly chooses w ∈ Z Z * q and sets P K ID = wP and s ID = w. B returns P K ID to A I and saves 
Note that, the above simulation for signing queries works even in the strong case that B does not know the secret value s ID corresponding to the public key P K ID of a user with identity ID. Forgery: The next step of the simulation is to apply the forking technique formalized in [14] . Let (m, (U, V ), ID I , P K IDI ) be a forgery output by A I at the end of the attack. If A I does not output ID = ID I as a part of the forgery then B aborts (the probability that B does not abort the simulation is O (1/q H1 )) . B then replays A I with the same random tape, but the different choice of the hash function H 3 and the same choice of the hash function H 2 to get another forgery (m, (U, V ), ID I , P K IDI ). Notice that the hash values h 3 = h 3 on (m, U, P K IDI ) for the two choices of H 3 . From the forking lemma, after a polynomial reply of the A I adversary, we obtain two valid signatures (m, (U, V ), ID I , P K IDI ) and (m, (U, V ), ID I , P K IDI ) with h 3 = h 3 . Then we have the following equalities, e(P, V ) = e(P K IDI , H 2 )e(P pub , U + h 3 Q I ), e(P, V ) = e(P K IDI , H 2 )e(P pub , U + h 3 Q I ), from which we obtain
. This completes our proof.
Theorem 2:
If a PPT forger A II has an advantage ε in forging a signature in an attack modeled by Game II after running in time t and making at most q Hi queries to random oracles H i for i = 2, 3, at most q E queries to the private-key extraction oracle, at most q P K queries to the public-key request oracle, at most q S queries to the signing oracle, and e is the base of the natural logarithm, then the CDH problem can be solved with probability ε 1 eqE (1 − (q S q H2 − 2)/2 k )ε, within time t < t+ (q H2 + q P K + 3q S )t m , where t m is the time to compute a scalar multiplication in G 1 . Proof: Suppose A II is a Type II adversary that (t, ε)-breaks our certificateless signature scheme. We show how to construct a t -time algorithm B that solves the CDH problem on G 1 with probability at least ε . Let (X = aP, Y = bP ∈ G 1 × G 1 ) be a random instance of the CDH problem taken as input by B. B randomly chooses s ∈ Z Z * q as the master key, and then initializes A II with P pub = sP and also the master key s. The adversary A II then starts making oracle queries such as those described in Game II. Note that the partial private key D ID = sH 1 (ID) can be computed by both B and A II , thus the hash function H 1 (·) is not modeled as a random oracle in this case. B maintains a list L = {(ID, P K ID , s ID , T )}, which does not need to be made in advance and is populated when A II makes certain queries specified below. Queries on Oracle H 2 : Suppose a tuple (m, U, P K ID ) is submitted to oracle H 2 (·). B first scans a list L 2 = {(m, U, P K ID , H 2 , h 2 )} to check whether H 2 has already been defined for that input. If so, the previously defined value is returned. Otherwise, B selects at random h 2 ∈ Z Z * q and defines the value of H 2 (m, U, P K ID ) as H 2 = h 2 Y ∈ G 1 . B adds the tuple (m, U, P K ID , H 2 , h 2 ) into the list L 2 and responds to A II by seting H 2 (m, U, P K ID ) = H 2 . Queries on Oracle H 3 : When a tuple (m, U, P K ID ) is submitted to oracle H 3 (·). B first scans a list L 3 = {(m, U, P K ID , h 3 )} to check whether H 3 has already been defined for that input. If so, the existing value is returned. Otherwise, B picks at random h 3 ∈ Z Z * q as a hash value of H 3 (m, U, P K ID ) and returns it to A II , and also stores the values in the list L 3 . Public Key Queries: Suppose the query is made on an identity ID.
• If the list L contains (ID, P K ID , s ID , T ), B returns P K ID to A II .
• If the list L does not contain (ID, P K ID , s ID , T ), B picks a number w ∈ Z Z * q at random. B flips a coin T ∈ {0, 1} that yields 0 with probability δ and 1 with probability 1 − δ. If T = 0, the value of P K ID is defined as wP ∈ G 1 . If T = 1, the value of P K ID is defined as wX ∈ G 1 . In both cases, B sets s ID = w, and inserts a tuple (ID, P K ID , s ID , T ) into a list L = {(ID, P K ID , s ID , T )} to keep track the way it answered the queries. B returns P K ID to A II . Private Key Extraction Queries: Suppose the query is made on an identity ID.
• This completes our proof.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reviewed the security of the efficient certificateless signature scheme proposed in [9] . we show that their scheme does not resist against public key replacement attacks, and gives the main cause suffered from attack. Furthermore, we proposed an improved certificateless signature scheme, which is existential unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks in the random oracle model and proves the security of the proposed scheme in Zhang's [3] security model.
